We consider a stochastic control problem for a trader who wishes to maximize the expected local time through generating price impact. The local time can be regarded as a proxy for the inventory of a central bank whose aim is to maintain a target zone.
Model setup and main results
Let (Ω, F , (F t ) t≥0 , P ) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions and supporting a standard Brownian motion W . We suppose that in the absence of a large-investor intervention the exchange rate S between two currencies is given by a Bachelier model,
where S 0 and σ are two positive constants. This unaffected exchange rate process will be impacted by the price impact components of two types of "big players". One of these "big players" models the central bank of one of the two currencies, whereas the second one stands for a strategic speculative investor or for the accumulated price impact of a group of such investors. It is the goal of the central bank to maintain a (one-sided) target zone in which the actual exchange rate must stay above a specified level c. Such target zones are frequently observed on financial markets. The central bank keeps up the target zone through the permanent price impact of trades that are executed as soon as the exchange rate threatens to fall below the level c, thereby creating an ever increasing inventory. This accumulation of inventory is often problematic for the central bank and frequently leads to the abandonment of the target zone regime. A notorious example is the "breaking of the Bank of England" by the investor George Soros on September 16, 1992. The strategy of the strategic investor over the time horizon [0, T ] is described through the trading speed (ξ t ) t≥0 in a linear Almgren-Chriss-type model, so that X t = Figure 1 : Plot of the GBP/DEM exchange rate from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1992. On September 16, 1992, the British government announced on exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which was followed by a rapid drop of the exchange rate. the accumulated inventory after trading over the time interval [0, t] . Here, we use a Markovian control that may depend on the current time t and the current exchange rate S t . It is important to note here that S denotes the actual exchange rate after the central bank intervention and not the unaffected exchange rate process S, which will typically not be observable to any market participant. Thus, we assume that ξ t is of the form 
• There exists a constant
By V we denote the class of all such functions v.
In the linear Almgren-Chriss model, the permanent price impact generated at time t by the strategy ξ in (1.1) is of the form γ t 0 ξ s ds = γ t 0 v(r, S r ) dr, where γ > 0 is the permanent impact parameter [1] . Thus, the actual exchange rate process is of the form
where R t is the permanent price impact generated by the response strategy of the central bank. This strategy must be nondecreasing and such that the stochastic integral equation (1.2) admits a solution S satisfying S t ≥ c for all t ∈ [0, T ] P -a.s. Moreover, the response R must be adapted to the natural filtration of S. As for the strategic investor's strategy, we could insist that R t is absolutely continuous in t, but since central banks typically face less restrictions on transaction costs than regular investors, we will only assume that t → R t (ω) is of bounded variation for P -a.e. ω ∈ Ω. Let us denote by R(v) the class of all processes R satisfying the preceding conditions for a given strategy v ∈ V.
The central bank has two main goals. First, the target zone must be maintained by guaranteeing that S v t ≥ c for all t. Second, the inventory accumulated by keeping up the target zone must be controlled. We assume that this inventory at time t is given proportional to the local time
of the semimartingale S v at c. Next we consider the optimal strategy of a speculative trader who tries to maximize the central bank's inventory with the goal of pushing it to its risk limits and so to force it to abandon the target zone. The accumulation of excessive risk is indeed one of the most common reasons why a central bank would abandon a target zone. Thus, the speculative investor aims to maximize the expected central bank inventory at a given future time T . That is, the goal is
According to the linear Almgren-Chriss model, the investor's trading strategy ξ t = v(t, S v t ) creates transaction costs, sometimes also called "slippage", proportional to
These costs arise, e.g., from short-term price impact effects and from the need to increase the proportion of market vs. limit orders in a strategy with high trading speed. We therefore assume that the goal of the investor is to
Our main result provides a closed-form solution to the preceding problem of stochastic optimal control and thus establishes a Stackelberg equilibrium in our stochastic differential game between trader and central bank. As a result, we have singled out the worst-case scenario a central bank may be facing when keeping up a (one-sided) target zone.
Theorem 1.1. Suppose that S 0 > c and let β = γ 2 /(2κσ 2 ) and
where L x t (W ) is the local time of the Brownian motion W at level x ∈ R. Then we have
, and there exists a unique strategy v * ∈ V for which the supremum is attained. It is given by
Remark 1.2. From Formula 1.3.3 on p. 161 in [5] we get a closed-form expression for U , 6) where erf(x) = 2 √ π
x 0 e −y 2 dy is the Gaussian error function. See Figure 3 for a plot of U (t, z) and v * (t, z). The value function U (t, z) (left) and the optimal strategy v * (t, z) (right) for σ = γ = κ = 1 and c = 0 .
An approximate control problem
In this section, we consider a regularized version of the control problem (1.3). This control problem provides the basis for the informed guess of the value function and optimal strategy in Theorem 1.1. It is also interesting in its own right. To this end, we define
and the "regularized local time"
Then we consider the following regularized version of the control problem (1.3):
It will be convenient to make the dependence of controlled reflecting diffusion S v on its initial value z := S 0 ≥ c explicit by writing S v,z . With this notation, we define the value function of the problem (2.1) by
The generator of S v,z is formally given by
with Neumann boundary condition at c. Hence, standard heuristic arguments suggest that the function V ε should solve the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation,
with initial condition
and Neumann boundary condition
The maximum over v ∈ R on the right-hand side of (2.4) is attained in
and so (2.4) becomes
γ 2 log h(t, z). Then, h must solve
with initial condition h(0, z) = 1 and boundary condition ∂ z h(t, c+) = 0. Equation (2.7) suggests that the optimal strategy v * ε for the problem (2.1) is given by
To make this statement more precise, note first that
This function is clearly satisfies a uniform Lipschitz condition in z.
Theorem 2.2. The function U ε is equal to the value function V ε in (2.2) and the strategy v * ε is the P z -a.s. unique optimal strategy in V.
Now we show that the approximate value functions approximate our original value function (1.4), which can also be represented as
As in Proposition 2.1, we let β = γ 2 /(2κσ 2 ).
3 Proofs
Proofs of the results from Section 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Let
Since G ε is bounded and smooth, we may apply Theorem 3.6 in Chapter 4 of [7] to conclude thath belongs to C 1,2 ([0, ∞) × R) and satisfies
Since G ε is symmetric around c, the same is true forh, and it follows that ∂ zh (t, c) = 0. Hence, the restriction ofh to [0, T ] × [c, ∞) satisfies (2.9) together with the initial and boundary conditionsh(0, z) = 1 and ∂ zh (t, c+) = 0. Retracing the steps that led to (2.9) now completes the proof of the assertion.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Itô's formula yields that for all v ∈ V P z -a.s.,
where we have used the HJB equation (2.4) as well as (2.6) together with the fact that dL c r (S v,z ) is supported on {r | S v,z r = c}. Since G ε and G ε are bounded, it follows from (2.11) that ∂ z U ε is bounded, and so
r ) dW r is a true martingale. Using the initial condition U ε (0, ·) = 0 and taking expectations in (3.1) gives
Taking the supremum over v ∈ V yields U ε (t, z) ≥ V ε (t, z) for all t and z. Next, by (2.7), we will have equality in (3.1), and hence in (3.2), if and only if
for a.e. r ∈ [0, t],
is bounded and continuously differentiable in both variables, hence v ε ∈ V.
The following lemma will be needed for the proof of Proposition 2.3.
Proof. The proof uses ideas from Lemma 2.2 in [3] . For simplicity, in this proof we will write L , we obtain the existence of a constant C 0 depending only on p and T such that
From the occupation time formula we have P -a.s.
Using (3.3) and Jensen's inequality we therefore have
(b) From (3.4) we get that for any ε ∈ (0, 1),
, and the right-hand side is finite according to Lemma 1 in [6] .
Proof of Proposition 2.3. We write again L c−z t for L c−z t (σW ). Using the Lipschitz continuity of the function log x for x ≥ 1, we get
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality thus yields Using this bound along with Lemma 3.1 (a) in (3.5) thus gives that U ε (t, z) → U (t, z), uniformly in (t, z) ∈ [0, T ] × R, as ε ↓ 0. Proof. Let ψ(t, x) := erf x σ √ 2t + e −βx+β 2 σ 2 t/2 1 − erf
For t > 0, we have ∂ t ψ(t, x) = βσ √ 2πt e −x 2 /(2tσ 2 ) + βσ 2 e (x−tβσ 2 ) 2 /(2tσ 2 ) 1 − erf x − βσ 2 t σ √ 2t , ∂ x ψ(t, x) = −βe −βx+β 2 σ 2 t/2 1 − erf x − βσ 2 t σ √ 2t , ∂ xx ψ(t, x) = 2 σ 2 ∂ t ψ(t, x).
From (1.6) we have U (t, z) =
